Neurodivergent Epistemics

Neurodivergent Epistemics

(exchanges between 04/12/2026 - 04/15/2026 on LinkedIn)

The following exchange emerged from an extended public dialogue concerning the epistemological foundations of neurodiversity theory, particularly questions surrounding neuronormativity, subjectivity, social structure, and the relationship between lived experience and critical analysis. While discussions surrounding neurodiversity often focus on identity, diagnosis, or inclusion, this conversation moved toward deeper philosophical questions regarding how neurodiversity functions as a framework for understanding normality, power, meaning-making, and consciousness itself.

The dialogue reflects broader tensions within contemporary neurodiversity scholarship concerning materiality and idealism, structure and subjectivity, insider and outsider epistemologies, and the extent to which neurodiversity can function as either opposition to or transcendence of neuronormative systems. It also illustrates the increasingly interdisciplinary nature of neurodiversity discourse as it intersects with disability studies, phenomenology, sociology, critical theory, philosophy of mind, and marginalized knowledge traditions.

Rather than presenting neurodiversity as a fixed or universally settled paradigm, this exchange demonstrates the ongoing negotiation of meaning taking place across neurodivergent scholars, advocates, and public intellectual spaces as the field continues to evolve.

Cole Denisen, PhD

Neurodiversity—as a term in itself—does not imply a norm. However, we cannot remove terms from the context in which they were produced, particularly when that language was developed by a marginalized community for a specific purpose. Neurodiversity emerged as part of a broader system of language designed to push back against dominant narratives of autistic experience—narratives already structured around an assumed “normal.”

In this sense, neurodiversity, neurodivergent, and neurotypical are not discrete labels but part of a shared system of meaning and epistemology.

Because of this, even if the term does not linguistically depend on a norm, the framework it belongs to still operates in relation to one. Removing terms like “neurodivergence” does not necessarily remove that underlying structure; it may simply make it less visible.

It would be like taking intersectionality and ignoring the entirety of Black feminist scholarship. It was the lived, cultural knowledge that produced the term in the first place.

Nazım Venutti

Cole Denisen, PhD I agree with the second part of your argument, namely that we cannot strip the meaning of a term from its original context.

But we are free to interpret the original intention. And I believe the original intention was not to merely claim a neurological difference to a perceived normality.

It was - at least from part of the movement - that there actually is no and should be no concept of a normality. That neurodiversity is "centerless".

I think this more faithfully captures the original context and hence makes your second argument (which I agree with) not apply to the statement.

Cole Denisen, PhD 

Nazım Venutti The communities and scholars who helped develop the term were quite explicit in how it was used and why it was needed—particularly those in Autism Network International and InLv. They were specifically and intentionally pushing back against Frith, Baron-Cohen, Bleuler, Bettelheim, Kanner, Asperger, etc. So I would argue that our interpretations are not unconstrained; they are shaped by the historical and political context in which the term emerged.

Where I think we may be talking past each other is the distinction between rejecting a norm as an ideal and existing in relation to a norm as a social structure. Even if neurodiversity is conceptually “centerless,” it still emerges within—and responds to—a world that is already organized around normative assumptions.

So the framework doesn’t need to posit a center in order to be shaped by one; its critical force comes from engaging that structure, not existing outside of it.

Nazım Venutti

Cole Denisen, PhD I want to understand you better before I respond, particularly this paragraph:

„Where I think we may be talking past each other is the distinction between rejecting a norm as an ideal and existing in relation to a norm as a social structure. Even if neurodiversity is conceptually “centerless,” it still emerges within—and responds to—a world that is already organized around normative assumptions.“

I understand this as differentiating between the ideal of a centerless concept (my interpretation of the term neurodiversity), and two things: 1) the historical fact that it emerged through opposition toward a „centered view“, and 2) that a center is still structurally and systemically prevalent and shaping our understand and views.

Is this more or less correct?

Cole Denisen, PhD

Nazım Venutti Yes—that’s a really good summary, and I think you’re capturing the distinction I’m trying to make.

The only piece I might add is that I see those elements as not just historical or contextual, but constitutive of the framework itself. In other words, neurodiversity doesn’t just emerge from or exist alongside normative structures—it continues to derive its meaning and critical force through its relationship to them. It exists and is made meaningful as a term through that relation to a normative system.

Nazım Venutti

Cole Denisen, PhD I understand that in your view, these elements of the neurodiversity framework you are referring to are constitutive of the framework as a consequence of the framework emerging through a relation to the system it is opposing. So neurodiversity as a movement and ideal, concluding from your points, is not and cannot be a form of transcendence from neuronormativity, but a form of opposition to neuronormativity.

I think this goes back to materialism vs idealism (very reductionist but not to open another can of worms), and you are presenting a fundamentally materialistic view. My own view is not materialistic or idealistic. I don't merely think of transcending neuronormativity through a concept such as neurodiversity as an idea. But I also do think that a concept such as neurodiversity as an idea can have an impact on the consciousness of an individual that allow them to transcend neuronormativity.

Cole Denisen, PhD

Nazım Venutti hmm. I'll have to think about this for a bit. My immediate thought is I would agree that concepts like neurodiversity can reshape how individuals understand themselves, and that this can feel like—and function as—a kind of transcendence. But that does not mean the underlying normative structures have been transcended. It means the subject has been repositioned in relation to them. I wrote a bit about this in my own published work.

Nazım Venutti

Cole Denisen, PhD I will read your published work. In the meantime, please excuse my ignorance regarding your existing work.

Since I am beginning to grasp your perspective much better, I think I understand that logically, from your perspective, this is true:

"But that does not mean the underlying normative structures have been transcended. It means the subject has been repositioned in relation to them."

This is exactly how it must look from an analytic position from "outside". This perspective is very common in (bot not exclusive to) Western thinking and especially scholarly approaches.

I do think there is a lot of value in them. But my perspective is more to what D.T. Suzuki would refer to as "to understand a frog, one must look to the world as a frog, not dissect a frog". I think both are complementary, not either-or. I don't think current framings of "lived experience" match what is meant by this perspective.

The closest I could find to it philosophically in the West is the phenomenology of Husserl and introspective way of thinking and reasoning (e.g. Franz Brentano, or to a degree, William James).

From that perspective, there is no subject that can be repositioned, as the subject is the one looking.

1/2

Nazım Venutti

Cole Denisen, PhD

An attempt at synthesis: What I mean by transcendence of neurnormativity is purely subjective - it refers to the subjects experience. Transcendence, here, is meant as a category of experience, not necessarily something observable from an outside perspective (except self-reports).

Objectively, I would agree with your assessment that the subject has "merely" been repositioned, with one caveat, that I would like to pose as a thought experiment:

Imagine that a) all subjects of a society, or b) a critical mass of subjects of a given society, were to experience such transcendence from neuronormativity, that it would objectively cease to exist, i.e. from an objective perspective be transcended? Imagine that this experience would not be merely a flash of an insight, but a transformative experience for the subjects.

Do you think for cases a) and/or b), that neuronormativity would cease to exist?

I have an agnostic / empirical / skeptic position on this: I believe that it cannot be known beforehand, but that it is our best or only shot, because any opposition to neuronormativity will ultimately lead to more neuronormativity in return. I am confident you will not agree at least to the last of my statements.

2/2

Cole Denisen, PhD

Nazım Venutti I wonder what happens to that distinction if I’m writing from the perspective of the frog. Positioning me as an outsider : "this is how it must look from an analytic position from ‘outside ’… common in Western scholarly approaches” assumes I am outside. It makes the assumption that I haven't lived this tension.

Does the structural analysis still count as “outside,” or does it suggest that even from within experience, those structures remain visible? Does the distinction hold if the one analyzing is an autistic subject?

Nazım Venutti

Cole Denisen, PhD When presented with this distinction by BPOC authors, it is very common for white authors to invalide this distinction as a form of oppression. It is a well-documented process (at least outside of the West) of neuronormative behavior (although not necessarily labeled as such) in itself.

It has frequently been used, for example, to dismiss and disregard indian, chinese and japanese philosophy. Sometimes only to rename it later into a latin or ancient greek word and use it without giving credit.

Otherwise, Zhuangzi would be credited with first describing neuronormativity. But it is disregarded. There is neuronormativity at work here: parables are not considered sufficient forms of describing, thinking and teaching. They are treated as anecdotal or as art, and white people frequently roll their eyes about this „ancient wisdom“ (a term frequently used sarcastically).

Cole Denisen, PhD   

Nazım Venutti I’m not dismissing your claim—I’m trying to test the limits of the assumption and how we’re drawing that insider/outsider distinction. Especially since I’m speaking from within that experience, not outside of it. In other words: does the distinction hold when applied to someone who is speaking from within the frame, rather than outside of it?

When the distinction is framed as analytic “outside,” it seems to position my perspective that way, and I’m trying to think through what that implies—particularly given that we’re engaging with a framework that originated within marginalized epistemologies.