"What I most want to talk about, however, is language. Like counters, stairs, and drinking fountains, language was built mostly by non-autistic people, with the obvious results, and my biggest frustration is this: the most important things about the way I perceive and interact with the world around me can only be expressed in terms that describe them as the absence of something important."
- A. Baggs (2009) in Up in the Clouds and Down in the Valley: My Richness and Yours
Note: The following essay was initially published as a shorter LinkedIn post on 11/16. The first version can be found under Random Thoughts.
In addition to teaching neurodiversity studies, I have also been working directly with institutions and programs seeking to leverage neurodiversity as part of transformational practice. It has been one of the more fulfilling experiences of my academic career, but also one of the more challenging.
Part of what makes this work so rewarding is the opportunity to engage with people who genuinely want to reconsider how their institutions understand, engage with, and support neurodivergent people. There is something exciting about being invited into these conversations, particularly when they create opportunities to imagine what our institutions might look like if we began taking neurodivergent knowledge, experiences, and ways of being seriously. But wanting to engage with neurodiversity and knowing how to engage with neurodiversity are not necessarily the same thing.
Two of the biggest challenges I have encountered concern institutional translation and what my colleague Sarah Silverman (2026) refers to in her work as neurodiversity literacy.
I have been thinking quite a bit about the relationship between these two ideas, particularly as more colleges, universities, and other organizations begin adopting the language of neurodiversity, establishing neurodiversity centers, and positioning themselves as leaders in neurodiversity-affirming practice.
And I keep returning to a relatively simple analogy.
Consider this: You are trying to teach a student calculus, but they have only encountered algebra. Before they can begin developing even a basic understanding of calculus, you first need to establish a foundation - a scaffold - building upon what they already know. In that process, they are inevitably going to make mistakes. Not necessarily because they are unwilling to learn, or because they are approaching the material in bad faith, but because they are encountering something that their existing knowledge has not adequately prepared them to understand.
Some of those mistakes will be relatively easy to recognize and correct. Others will be more difficult, particularly when the conceptual frameworks they are drawing upon are not equipped to engage fully with the framework they are trying to learn. Even when those mistakes are pointed out, they may not yet possess the knowledge necessary to recognize why they are mistakes.
And even when they eventually develop a rudimentary understanding of calculus, there remains an enormous difference between being able to recognize and apply its basic principles and possessing the expertise necessary to teach it to others, much less grapple with its deeper theoretical and practical implications. Assuming, of course, that they can even recognize that gap.
"this is the oppressor's language
yet I need it to talk to you"
Adrienne Rich (1968) in The Burning of Paper Instead of Children
Now complicate the scenario. Suppose the only vocabulary available for describing calculus was built for algebra. A limit becomes “dividing by zero, but allowed.” A derivative becomes “a slope formula that doesn’t quite work.” The student isn’t only missing knowledge. The words they have were built around the framework they already hold, so each new idea arrives pre-translated into the terms of what it was meant to move beyond.
Of course, mathematics does not actually work this way, and that is where the analogy fails. It assumes a shared and neutral language: algebra does not describe calculus as a lesser version of itself, and no one’s way of knowing is cast as the absence of something. Neurodiversity encounters no such neutrality. The language available for describing neurological difference was built largely within the frameworks that neurodiversity challenges, so the problem isn’t only a gap in what institutions know but a mismatch in what they can say.
None of this requires bad faith. One does not need bad faith to reproduce colonial relations; they are reproduced through ordinary routines: whose language counts as neutral, whose knowledge counts as evidence, who is authorized to translate for whom.
Something related happens when institutions begin engaging with neurodiversity.
When neurodiversity is introduced as a critical framework - one rooted in the intellectual, cultural, and political traditions of autistic and other neurodivergent communities - it does not enter an empty space. It encounters existing institutional structures, assumptions, professional practices, and ways of knowing. Consequently, institutions may interpret neurodiversity through the very frameworks that neurodiversity seeks to challenge.
An institution might, for example, encounter a critique of neuronormativity and translate it into a conversation about improving individualized accommodations. And to be clear, accommodations are important. They can make an enormous difference in people's lives, and improving access to them is worthwhile. But there is an important distinction between helping neurodivergent people navigate existing institutional structures and examining the structures that make those accommodations necessary in the first place. An accommodation might allow a student to participate more fully in a learning environment organized around particular expectations of attention, communication, behavior, or performance. A critical neurodiversity approach might ask why those expectations were established, whose ways of knowing and being they privilege, and whether the institution should be organized differently.
These are not mutually exclusive approaches. But they are not interchangeable. And when the former is treated as equivalent to the latter, something important can become lost in translation. The language of neurodiversity is adopted, but its critical implications are not necessarily understood. This is not always a matter of resistance or unwillingness. Sometimes, institutions simply do not yet possess the conceptual tools necessary to recognize what is being asked of them.
Consider the increasingly common idea of a neurodiversity center:
What, exactly, makes a center a neurodiversity center? Is it a hub of services for neurodivergent individuals?
A place where students can receive individualized support, develop academic skills, and access resources?
Or is it also a site for rethinking the institution's own norms, practices, and assumptions about neurological difference?
Ideally, perhaps, it might be both.
But without a sufficiently developed understanding of neurodiversity, the first can easily pass for the second. And that distinction matters. Because being familiar with the language of neurodiversity is not the same as understanding neurodiversity, and understanding neurodiversity is not necessarily the same as being equipped to put it into practice.
There is another dimension to this that I find particularly interesting. What happens when an institution does not yet possess the knowledge necessary to recognize the limitations of its own understanding? Returning to the calculus analogy, imagine a student who has learned enough calculus to recognize some of its terminology and apply a handful of basic principles, but not enough to appreciate the limits of their knowledge. Now imagine that student being placed in charge of teaching calculus to others. The problem is no longer simply that they misunderstand the material. Their understanding has become the foundation upon which others are expected to learn. Something similar can happen institutionally.
An institution adopts the language of neurodiversity, establishes a center or initiative, develops programming, hires personnel, and begins offering professional development. These efforts might be evaluated using familiar institutional measures: student satisfaction, retention, service utilization, participation, or the number of people served. And these are not necessarily bad measures. But what, exactly, are they measuring? An institution might demonstrate considerable success in providing services to neurodivergent students without ever meaningfully engaging with neurodiversity as a critical intellectual and political framework. It might become increasingly confident in its neurodiversity practice while continuing to reproduce the very assumptions that neurodiversity seeks to challenge. The institution's existing frameworks determine what counts as meaningful engagement with neurodiversity, and the resulting practices are then used to validate those frameworks.
In effect, the institution becomes both the interpreter and evaluator of its own understanding. This creates a rather peculiar problem: institutional misunderstanding can become institutionalized. And once institutionalized, it can become increasingly difficult to recognize, much less challenge.
This raises another question that I have been thinking about in partnership with Sarah and other autsitic scholars, particularly as neurodiversity becomes an increasingly visible part of higher education. Who gets to claim expertise in neurodiversity?
I want to be careful here, because expertise is not something I understand as belonging exclusively to people with particular credentials, disciplinary affiliations, or academic appointments. Indeed, much of the intellectual history of neurodiversity challenges precisely that assumption. Autistic and other neurodivergent communities were developing sophisticated critiques of neurological normality, medical authority, and social exclusion long before neurodiversity became a recognizable area of academic scholarship or institutional practice. And much of that knowledge emerged outside traditional academic institutions.
At the same time, expertise in one area does not automatically confer expertise in another. Someone can possess extensive experience in disability services, special education, psychology, or autism support without necessarily possessing a developed understanding of neurodiversity's intellectual history, theoretical foundations, or political commitments. There may be considerable overlap. But overlap is not equivalence.
And yet, institutions routinely confer authority through professional titles, administrative positions, credentials, and organizational structures. An institution can appoint someone to lead a neurodiversity initiative, establish a center, or develop educational programming without necessarily having the expertise within the institution to evaluate whether those efforts are grounded in a meaningful understanding of neurodiversity. The result is a rather interesting tension.
What happens when institutions acquire the authority to define, teach, and represent neurodiversity before they have developed the expertise necessary to understand it?
And what happens when those institutional definitions subsequently become the basis upon which others learn what neurodiversity means?
This is not simply a question of professional qualifications. It is also a question of epistemic authority: whose knowledge is recognized, whose knowledge is treated as credible, and who gets to determine what counts as an appropriate interpretation of neurodiversity.
This is where I see connections to my broader work on neurodivergent knowledge production, epistemic injustice, and what I have been thinking about as misrecognition. One of the challenges of introducing a critical framework into an institution is that the institution may recognize the language without recognizing the knowledge that gives that language meaning. An institution might welcome neurodivergent perspectives, invite neurodivergent people to share their experiences, or incorporate neurodiversity terminology into its mission and programming. But what happens when those perspectives challenge the institution's own assumptions? What happens when neurodivergent knowledge does not simply supplement existing professional practices, but calls into question the authority of those practices themselves? I think this is where the distinction between recognition and misrecognition becomes particularly useful.
Neurodivergent knowledge may be acknowledged, even celebrated, while still being interpreted through frameworks that constrain what it is permitted to mean. A neurodivergent scholar might offer a critique of the institution's underlying assumptions about normality, only to have that critique translated into a recommendation for more inclusive programming. A neurodivergent student might challenge the expectation that they must continually adapt to institutional norms, only for that challenge to become a discussion about teaching students better self-advocacy skills. Neither response is necessarily without value, but both can leave the underlying critique unaddressed. The institution recognizes that something important has been said, but interprets it in ways that preserve the very assumptions being challenged. In this sense, the problem is not simply that neurodivergent knowledge goes unheard. It is that the knowledge may be heard, acknowledged, and incorporated without ever being allowed to challenge the frameworks through which it is understood. And because institutions possess considerable authority to determine what counts as legitimate knowledge and practice, these translations can become authoritative themselves.
The institution does not merely misunderstand neurodiversity. It can begin reproducing its misunderstanding as neurodiversity.
I also think it is important to distinguish between institutional unfamiliarity and institutional resistance. As I mentioned earlier, I do not believe every failure to engage meaningfully with neurodiversity reflects bad faith. People can genuinely care about neurodivergent students and communities while possessing an incomplete or underdeveloped understanding of neurodiversity as a critical framework. Indeed, some of the most productive conversations I have had with institutions have emerged precisely because people were willing to recognize the limits of their existing knowledge and reconsider assumptions they had previously taken for granted. That willingness matters. But there is a difference between not understanding a critique and understanding a critique that one is unwilling, or perhaps institutionally unable, to act upon.
An institution might initially struggle to understand neurodiversity because its existing frameworks have not prepared it to do so. Yet as that understanding develops, the implications may become increasingly difficult to reconcile with existing practices, professional roles, administrative priorities, or distributions of authority. What began as a challenge of conceptual understanding can become a challenge of institutional power. After all, reconsidering institutional norms is one thing. Redistributing authority, changing professional practices, or questioning who has historically been recognized as an expert is quite another. This suggests that some failures of institutional translation emerge because institutions do not yet understand what neurodiversity asks of them. Others may emerge precisely because they are beginning to understand. And no amount of additional terminology or professional-development training can, by itself, resolve that tension.
So where does this leave us? I think it helps to distinguish three related, but not necessarily equivalent, dimensions of institutional engagement with neurodiversity.
The first is literacy.
Does the institution possess the conceptual foundations necessary to understand neurodiversity as more than a descriptive recognition that brains differ? Has it meaningfully engaged with the intellectual, cultural, and political traditions from which neurodiversity emerged? Can it recognize the critical questions that neurodiversity raises about neurological normality, expertise, and institutional authority?
The second is translation.
How does the institution interpret and incorporate that understanding into its existing structures? What happens to neurodiversity's critical commitments as they encounter established professional practices, organizational priorities, and institutional assumptions? Which aspects of the framework become recognizable and actionable, and which are diminished or left behind?
The third is transformation.
To what extent does the institution allow its engagement with neurodiversity to change the institution itself? I think that final question is especially important. Because it is entirely possible for an institution to become increasingly knowledgeable about neurodiversity without becoming meaningfully transformed by it. It can develop more sophisticated language, expand programming, improve services, and increase its visibility as a neurodiversity-affirming institution while leaving many of its underlying assumptions intact. And again, these developments may represent meaningful improvements in the lives of neurodivergent people. They should not be dismissed simply because they do not constitute structural transformation. But neither should they be mistaken for the whole of what neurodiversity makes possible.
Neurodiversity, as I understand it, is not simply a framework for recognizing or accommodating neurological difference. It is also a critical, embodied framework through which the assumptions, structures, and relations of power that produce neurological normality become available for examination and challenge.
This does not mean that there is one singular, uncontested interpretation of neurodiversity that institutions must learn to reproduce. Neurodiversity has a rich and evolving intellectual history, shaped by ongoing disagreements, debates, and contributions from diverse neurodivergent communities. Nor does it mean that institutions have nothing to contribute to that development. Quite the opposite.
I think meaningful engagement with neurodiversity creates opportunities for reciprocal learning, new forms of knowledge production, and institutional practices that might not otherwise have been imaginable. But those opportunities depend, at least in part, upon a willingness to engage with neurodiversity as something more than an additional framework to incorporate into existing institutional arrangements. They require institutions to recognize that their own ways of knowing are situated, historically produced, and potentially implicated in the very problems they are seeking to address. And they require a willingness to be challenged by the knowledge they claim to value.
I keep returning to this question because I think it captures much of what is at stake. What does it actually mean for an institution to become neurodiversity-affirming? Is it enough to recognize neurological differences, offer individualized support, and create spaces where neurodivergent people can participate more comfortably within existing institutional structures? Those things matter, certainly. But what would it mean to move beyond accommodating neurodivergent people within institutions toward reconsidering those institutions through neurodivergent knowledge? What would it mean to treat neurodivergent people not simply as recipients of services, sources of lived experience, or participants in institutional initiatives, but as intellectual contributors whose knowledge might fundamentally reshape how institutions understand themselves? And perhaps most importantly, what would it mean for an institution to recognize that becoming neurodiversity-affirming is not simply a matter of acquiring new knowledge, but of learning to question the authority of what it already knows?
I do not think these are easy questions, nor do I think there are simple answers that can be universally applied across institutions. But I do think they are questions we need to take seriously, particularly as neurodiversity becomes increasingly visible within higher education and as more institutions establish centers, programs, and initiatives under its name. Because the difficulty is not simply that institutions must learn to speak the language of neurodiversity. It is that they must also learn to recognize when their own ways of understanding the world prevent them from hearing what that language is actually saying. And perhaps that is one of the more difficult challenges of institutional translation. What happens when an institution becomes authorized to teach, administer, and represent a critical framework before it has learned how to be challenged by that framework?
I suspect that answering that question will require considerably more than learning a new vocabulary.